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Antitrust Liability of
Municipal Corporations:
The Per Se Rule vs. The
Rule of Reason-A
Reasonable Compromise
Ramon A. Klitzke*
I. THE PROBLEM
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' the Supreme
Court held that a city is not automatically immune from the antitrust
laws when the state grants it power to own and operate an electric utility
system both within and beyond the city limits. However, the Court offered
no suggestion as to the choice of an appropriate analysis for imposing
antitrust liability once immunity has been discarded.2 When this issue
reaches the Court, its resolution will be difficult because the conduct of
the cities in City of Lafayette is usually summarily held to violate the
Sherman Act, without regard to business alternatives or the reasonable-
ness of the resulting restraints on competition.8
In City of Lafayette, the cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana,
sued the Louisiana Power & Light Company, alleging violations of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.4 In a counterclaim, Louisiana Power
charged the cities with several federal antitrust violations: (a) sham litiga-
tion to delay or prevent Louisiana Power's construction of a nuclear
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. B.S. 1950, Illinois Institute of Technology;
J.D. 1957, Indiana University, Indianapolis; LL.M. 1958, New York University. The author is
greatly indebted to attorney James H. Gormley for the excellent research and analysis he generously
contributed.
1. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, alludes to the problem but does not attempt to
solve it. 435 U.S. at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
3. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
4. 435 U.S. at 391-92; City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 432 (5th
Cir. 1976). The plaintiff cities' allegations were not involved in the appeal.
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power plant; (b) anticompetitive covenants in the cities' debentures that
excluded all competition in electric power service within the municipal
boundaries; (c) the extension of power service beyond the time periods
allowed by state law; and (d) requiring customers outside the city limits
to buy electricity from the city in order to obtain gas and water.'
The fourth allegation, which on its face constitutes tying, is a business
practice that has been denounced repeatedly as per se illegal without any
allowance for business justification.' Whether the species of tying alleg-
edly engaged in by the City of Plaquemine would be per se illegal has not
yet been determined.7 If it is, however, the question arises whether a mu-
nicipal corporation is so imbued with the public interest that the legiti-
mate economic power deliberately granted by the state is not of the type
contemplated by the normal tying cases. In other words, is the dominant
economic power enjoyed by the tying service, the city's gas and water
service, inherent in the delegation of municipal power to the city? If so, a
preliminary analysis is required to determine whether a per se rule or a
rule of reason approach is appropriate.6
A second major issue in City of Lafayette is the allegation of sham
litigation for the primary purpose of unreasonably restraining Louisiana
Power's ability to compete. This issue entails analysis substantially differ-
ent from that for per se liability.' The landmark case of Parker v.
Brown10 rendered antitrust liability inapplicable to "state action" where
the state imposed anticompetitive restraints "as an act of government.""1
This rule was extended later to concerted efforts to influence lawmakers
to enact legislation detrimental to competitors of the lobbyists, or to influ-
5. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6; 532 F.2d at 432-33.
6. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969). See also L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 150, 152 (1977).
7. Electrical service was tied to the tying product, gas and water service; the defendant allegedly
had the requisite market power to unreasonably restrain competition in electrical service. 435 U.S. at
403-04. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969). The
cities, the original plaintiffs, alleged improper refusals to wheel power, boycotts directed at the cities,
and sham litigation. 435 U.S. at 392 n.5.
8. This issue could easily have been addressed in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976), which involved an allegation of tying "free" light bulbs (the cost of which must have been
absorbed in the rates charged for the tying service) to electrical service. But the case did not address
this issue. It was held that the anticompetitive activity did not qualify for the state action exemption
since the free light bulb program was not mandated by state regulation. Id. at 598. In City of Lafay-
ette, on the other hand, the issue was "under what circumstances a State's subdivisions engaging in
anticompetitive activities should be deemed to be acting as agents of the State." 435 U.S. at 410 n.40.
9. Interestingly enough, each party alleged sham litigation by the other. 435 U.S. at 392 nn.5&6.
10. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
11. Id. at 350-52. See State Action, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1281 (1980).
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ence the executive branch to enforce such laws." The Supreme Court has
warned, however, that there may be instances in which the alleged con-
spiracy "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."" Such
sham efforts were found in California Motor Transport v. Trucking Un-
limited" where the defendants had instituted state and federal proceed-
ings to resist and defeat applications for trucking company operating
rights. A cursory analysis indicates that the sham litigation rule should
apply to a municipal corporation in the same way that it does to a private
business competitor, at least when the municipality engages in proprietary
activity in competition with private business. This interesting and complex
issue is addressed by a companion article in this symposium and is not
discussed here.
This article addresses the issue of the choice of appropriate antitrust
analysis of municipal proprietary conduct 5 and will suggest some reasons
for modification of the traditional approach. Uniform application of the
antitrust laws to municipal and non-municipal enterprises alike is appeal-
ing because of the massive volume of precedent and judicial experience
with non-municipal antitrust issues. Uniformity begets certainty, and pre-
dictability is as necessary to municipal corporations as it is to other busi-
nesses. However, strict application of traditional antitrust concepts to mu-
nicipalities may preclude consideration of unique factors that do not
affect competition but that do relate to the municipality's goal of serving
the public interest. A municipal corporation differs from private enter-
prise in purpose, function, and method of operation. Equating these dis-
tinguishable entities for all antitrust purposes produces inequitable
results.
Initially, this article undertakes a brief overview of the current state of
antitrust analysis. The complementary concepts of the rule of reason and
the per se doctrine, as currently applied, are central to the adjudication of
anticompetitive conduct. Continuing from that point, it will be instructive
to examine antitrust analysis in cases where purported immunities have
12. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-71 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Nocerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961). See also Califor-
nia Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (petition of administrative agency
by competitors immune from antitrust liability).
13. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144 (1961).
14. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
15. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger, quoting the district court's opinion, denotes
this as, "business activity," "activity in which a profit is realized." 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). The old governmental-proprietary distinction is not being referre:d to at this point.
1980:2531
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not been found to apply. Recent decisions involving the learned profes-
sions and regulated utilities suggest, by analogy, the manner in which mu-
nicipal conduct might be analyzed if a modified approach is not used.
Traditional antitrust analysis does not properly account for the unique
business setting in which cities operate and the public policies underlying
municipal decisions. Thus, section IV of this article provides a modified
approach for consideration of these factors. Finally, the article deals with
two related considerations: the extent to which municipalities should be
permitted to initiate sham litigation and the question of whether the ap-
propriate antitrust rule should be applied retroactively, purely prospec-
tively, or partially prospectively. 16
II. THE RULE OF REASON AND ITS COUNTERPART, THE PER SE
DOCTRINE
The vague, overbroad language of section 1 of the Sherman Act 7 in-
vites substantial judicial interpretation. It is recognized that the intent of
Congress was to reach as far as the Constitution would permit;16 never-
theless, some limitation on the sweep of the act was required. The classic
articulation of the standard by which business conduct was to be judged
came in Standard Oil Co. v. United States. 9 There, the Sherman Act
was construed to prohibit only those acts that unduly restrain trade.20 The
Court stated that "the criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the
purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have been com-
mitted, is the rule of reason . . . . 21 This rule was further delineated in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
16. See text accompanying notes 110-23 infra.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976): "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, . . . is declared to be illegal."
The statute was originally enacted on July 12, 1890. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 609.
18. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (citing Mande-
ville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948)).
19. 221 U.S. I (1911).
20. Id. at 60.
21. Id. at 62.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts."
In sum, only those restraints that unduly or unreasonably restrain trade
violate the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, unreasonableness may
be found only after all market considerations, business reasons, and viable
alternatives are reckoned with.
Recent cases have relied primarily upon the classic enunciation of the
rule of reason.2 8 It must be observed that the scope of the analysis is
limited, as expressed in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States2 ' where the Court noted that the inquiry into the reasona-
bleness of a restraint "is confined to a consideration of impact on competi-
tive conditions."2 " No broad justification is permitted; only the scope of
the competitive effect should be considered. Thus, under the rule of rea-
son, an anticompetitive restraint on trade will not be excused by counter-
vailing considerations of public safety or welfare.
Once the rule of reason had received judicial acceptance, certain busi-
ness practices were found so frequently and clearly destructive of compe-
tition that there was little need to dwell upon possible justification for
them. Although the term "per se" had not yet been adopted, an early case
involving an agreed division of markets by horizontal competitors summa-
rily held the agreement anticompetitive, without regard to the market
conditions for the agreement."
Although the strictures of the rule were later shaken 2 7 in its final form
the per se rule was embraced as the prescribed test for price fixing,28
group boyotts,' division of markets between horizontal competitors, 0
and tying arrangements.8 ' A frequently-quoted test for applying the per
se rule was enunciated by Justice Black in Northern Pacific Railway v.
United States:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
22. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
23. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In both cases, Chicago Board of Trade was quoted as
a statement of the rule.
24. 435 U.S. at 690-91 & n.17.
25. Id. at 690 & n.16.
26. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), arf'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
27. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
28. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
29. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
30. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
31. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
1980:253]
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conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonable-
ness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it
also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved,
as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether
a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often
wholly fruitless when undertaken.82
The Court has cautioned against hasty adoption of a per se rule for prac-
tices formerly analyzed under the rule of reason; only after considerable
experience with certain business relationships should courts classify them
as per se antitrust violations.88 While the Court has referred to the per se
rule as "a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy and enforcement, '84
such a drastic rule is not necessarily appropriate for analyzing the activity
of municipalities. Municipalities are clothed with a protective mantle of
public policy, and there may be "redeeming virtue" that outweighs any
"pernicious effect." Several cases suggest that traditional per se concepts
do not apply in unusual contexts85 and the proprietary activity of a mu-
nicipal corporation may qualify for special treatment.
A number of factors are relevant in deciding whether to extend a per se
rule to a particular business practice not theretofore adjudicated violative
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. A preliminary process applies a "mini
rule of reason" for this purpose. The per se rule is justified when:
(1) the practice unreasonably and substantially restrains competition
in most instances;
(2) legitimate objectives or redeeming virtues are rarely present,
while viable business alternatives are usually present;
(3) it is necessary to dispense with lengthy and complex litigation
over monopoly power and issues of purpose or effect ot business prac-
tice; and
(4) a bright line is useful in distinguishing the practice from other
32. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
33. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
34. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
35. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) and Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), utilities were subjected to standard antitrust analy-
sis where they exceeded the scope of the statutory monopoly. A municipality, however, does not nec-
essarily lend itself to traditional analysis since different public policies obtain.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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less anticompetitive practices.8 6
The Supreme Court has not retreated from its position that a number
of business restraints warrant the summary treatment the per se rule pro-
vides.9 7 Some practices, such as price fixing, have become so firmly en-
gulfed by the rule that little preliminary analysis is needed when the ear-
marks of the practice are found. Other types of restraint gradually are
being included in the per se category after careful consideration by courts.
Occasionally, business practice is even removed from the per se cate-
gory. 8 Classification or declassification of the practice requires detailed
analysis of the competitive market conditions and substantial judicial jus-
tification for the change. a9 For the antitrust defendant, a determination
that challenged conduct constitutes a per se violation is highly significant.
The effect of the per se doctrine's conclusive presumption of illegality is to
foreclose any proof of excuse or justification for the activity40 and the
detailed inquiry under the rule of reason is unavailable. A per se rule is
justified because it provides clear guidelines to the business community,
allows greater predictability, and minimizes the burdens on the judicial
system imposed by the more complex rule of reason cases.4 1 As the Su-
preme Court has noted, courts often are of limited utility in examining
difficult economic problems;42 however, courts usually do not apply per se
rules to business restraints until they have had considerable experience
analyzing them. 3
Allegations of antitrust violation require a meticulous and painstaking
preliminary investigation to classify the challenged conduct into one of a
number of competitive restraints that have been catalogued in the past.
Where the type of activity is new or unique, a more detailed inquiry is
required. White Motor Co. v. United States" was the first case to come
36. See the extensive discussion in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977). See also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 314 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 70-72 (1977).
37. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Brbadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
38. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977). Sylvania overruled
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which had declared vertical territorial
restrictions to be per se illegal where title to goods had passed to a buyer.
39. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
40. "Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
particular commercial practices . . . .Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se
rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time
and expense necessary to identify them." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
50 n.16 (1977).
41. Id.
42. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
43. Id. at 607-08.
44. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
1980:253]
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before the Supreme Court involving a challenge to a vertical territorial
restriction. The Court indicated that comprehensive knowledge of the ac-
tual impact of the restraint was required.
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to be certain .... We need to
know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements
on competition to decide whether they . . . should be classified as per
se violations of the Sherman Act.4"
If the alleged restraint is not readily identifiable as one of the estab-
lished per se types, categorization analysis is utilized before proceeding to
apply the rule. Thus, in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,"' it was necessary for
the Court to go beyond mere form and to determine the substance of the
territorial restraints in question. 47 Once the Court found that the re-
straints were, in fact, horizontal, the agreements were held illegal per se.4 8
Categorization analysis also seeks to pinpoint denominative elements of
the per se offense. For example, in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp.4 the Court's categorization analysis involved extensive
economic and market analysis to show specific elements of a tying
situation.50
The dogmatic approach of the per se doctrine is thus ameliorated to
some degree by allowing the defendant the opportunity to show, at an
early stage in the inquiry, that a per se rule is inappropriate. Further-
more, depending upon the species of conduct involved, in-depth analysis of
the market and economic structure of the business and industry must be
made in some cases. The threshold opportunity to justify or explain the
business conduct is critical for the defendant because, if a per se rule is
applied, no further explanation or justification will be permitted.
The Burger Court has adopted a sympathetic attitude to antitrust goals
and gives preference to antitrust rather than regulatory solutions to com-
petitive restraints.6" The Court has moved, to some degree, from a strict,
45. Id. at 263.
46. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
47. Licenses granted by Scaly to local manufacturers contained territorial restrictions. Although
this arrangement appeared to be a vertical restraint, it was classified as a horizontal allocation of
territory because Scaly was controlled by the licensees. Id.
48. Id. at 357-58.
49. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
50. This kind of analysis is required to show that a party has sufficient economic power with re-
spect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product,
as well as to show that a not unsubstantial amount of interstate commerce is affected. Id. at 499-506.
51. Posner, The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 819, 821
(1978).
260 [ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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abstract per se approach to more realistic rule of reason analysis.,. This
approach should bring more meticulous analysis of the economic realities
of competitive restraints." On the other hand, the antitrust defendant
should now be able to marshal more persuasive reasons to justify the re-
straint before succumbing to the compulsion of the per se rule.
For the municipal defendant, the implications of the foregoing analysis
are significant. First, the continued vitality of antitrust litigation against
municipalities is assured. Second, a move away from frequent application
of per se rules may accrue to the benefit of cities, because special eco-
nomic considerations may be offered in their defense. Third, where possi-
ble per se violations are asserted, the preliminary inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the activity may be the only opportunity for
municipalities to offer unique justifications in defense. Finally, after Pro-
fessional Engineers,4 there is considerable doubt that the traditional rule
of reason approach is flexible enough to take public interest factors into
account. With this in mind, the next section of this article deals with the
possibility of special treatment in the absence of a specific antitrust
immunity.
III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN THE ABSENCE OF IMMUNITY
As was the case in Lafayette, the issue of immunity frequently is raised
on a motion for summary judgment or dismissal. There is thus sparse
guidance from case law as to the method by which courts will apply anti-
trust law to municipalities." It is instructive to examine related cases ap-
plying antitrust law in the absence of immunity to entities other than mu-
nicipalities. While the results in these cases may not be particularly
encouraging to municipal defendants, they indicate that courts might con-
sider distinctions between different types of enterprise.
A. The Learned Professions
Whatever hope there was for the existence of antitrust immunity for
the learned professions was effectively eliminated by the decision in Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar." In that case, fee schedules for member attor-
52. Bock, An Economist's View of the Supreme Court's Recent Antitrust Decisions, 47 ABA AN-
TITRUST L.J. 829, 830 (1978).
53. Id. at 844.
54. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978); Woolen
v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In Woolen, the court merely stated
that the city "must play by the same competition rules as others." Id. at 1040.
56. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Although there was a Parker defense raised in Goldfarb as well, the
1980:253]
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neys were alleged to violate the antitrust law. The Court first considered
the conduct and found: "[A] naked agreement . . . the effect on prices is
plain . . . . [A] classic illustration of price fixing."'67 This, under tradi-
tional analysis, was a clear per se violation; there is no suggestion that
any approach other than a traditional one was used to reach this conclu-
sion. As to the immunity of the profession, the Court stated: "The nature
of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act . . . nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice
controlling."" Thus, the lack of immunity meant liability under tradi-
tional analysis. As in City of Lafayette, the status or identity of the de-
fendant did not provide an antitrust defense. Further, the public service
aspects in Goldfarb did not justify special antitrust treatment.
It is important to note, however, that the Court qualified its finding
with a footnote:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act . . . . [A] particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sher-
man Act in another context, [may] be treated differently.
If a certain activity is to be treated differently, and the immunity deter-
mination is not to be the source of special consideration, then flexibility
should be used in applying the antitrust laws after immunity has been
rejected. The end suggested by the Goldfarb footnote could be achieved
by modification of traditional antitrust analysis.
In Professional Engineers, the Court did not opt for this alternative,
but merely restated the classic rule of reason test and refused to consider
other non-competitive justifications. 0 Whether the Court applied a per se
rule or the rule of reason is uncertain." In either case, however, the Court
avoided the special treatment suggested in Goldfarb.
These cases are consistent with Lafayette since the status or identity of
the defendant was not, of itself, sufficient for immunity. In each case, the
restraint involved was a species of price fixing, a practice absolutely and
vigorously condemned by antitrust courts. Neither case, therefore,
presented a compelling need for innovative analysis. It is unlikely that any
analysis here deals only with the defendant's reliance on immunity for a learned profession.
57. Id. at 782-83 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 788-89 n.17.
60. 435 U.S. 679, 686-96 (1978).
61. Note, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the
Sherman Act, II U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 414 (1978); Note, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 260 (1978).
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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justifications could be offered that would offset the particularly negative
effect of price fixing in a free market.62 Nonetheless, a possibility for a
more liberal approach may ultimately be found in cases involving differ-
ent conduct.
B. Regulated Utilities
Analysis of antitrust violations by regulated activities again reflects a
traditional analysis. There is, however, some indication from the Supreme
Court that utilities may warrant special treatment because of the unique
market structure in which they operate.
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States," the Court found a per se
violation of the Sherman Act in contract provisions that restricted the
utility's obligation to "wheel" or wholesale power. The Court also found
that Otter Tail was using its monopoly power unlawfully to maintain its
dominant position in the market for electricity in rural areas."" The ma-
jority opinion is a straightforward application of traditional antitrust
concepts.
The dissent, however, in this 4-3 decision, raised some interesting ques-
tions. Justice Stewart observed that Otter Tail was part of a "highly regu-
lated, natural-monopoly industry wholly different from those that have
given rise to ordinary antitrust principles." 65 He also noted that, under
the facts of the case, there would be a monopoly at the retail level,
whether power was sold by Otter Tail or by a municipally owned com-
pany. This factor, in his view, sufficiently distinguished the case for anti-
trust purposes: "Antitrust principles applicable to other industries cannot
be blindly applied to a unilateral refusal to deal on the part of a power
company, operating in a regime of. . . licensed monopolies."" The dis-
senting opinion in Otter Tail was subsequently referred to in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co.67 The majority in Cantor recognized the special char-
acter of public utilities and noted that regulation, either state or federal,
is imposed on utilities to "avoid the consequences of unrestrained compe-
tition." 68 Referring to the dissent in Otter Tail Power, the Court stated:
[P]ublic utility regulation typically assumes that the private firm is a
62. See Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine
Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 31, 73 (1979).
63. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
64. Id. at 377-79.
65. Id. at 382 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 389.
67. 428 U.S. 579, 596 n.35 (1976).
68. Id. at 595.
1980:253]
HeinOnline -- 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 263 1980
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
natural monopoly and that public controls are necessary to protect the
consumer from exploitation. There is no logical inconsistency between
requiring such a firm to meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exer-
cising its natural monopoly powers and also to comply with antitrust
standards to the extent that it engages in business activity in competi-
tive areas of the economy."
This suggests that traditional antitrust analysis applies when the utility
is operating in traditional competitive activity. Where competition is not
the norm, it is assumed that appropriate state regulation exists to forestall
the evils of "unrestrained competition" or natural monopoly. This does
not anticipate the problem created by City of Lafayette. How will the
antitrust law be applied to a natural monopoly, not subject to state regu-
lation 7 0 and not necessarily operating in an area of normal business
activity?
The concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun suggests a "rule of rea-
son" balancing test for evaluating the anticompetitive conduct. 71 The bal-
ance to be struck is between harm to competition and benefit to state
interests, such as public health or safety. Justice Blackmun recognized
that state-sanctioned monopoly and private activity should not be treated
alike; the existence of state delegation of power gives weight to the justifi-
cation on public interest grounds.7 2
The central issue in Cantor was, of course, the breadth of the state
action immunity. For the purposes of the decision, the antitrust violation
was assumed. The balancing test proposed by Justice Blackmun was in-
tended to be a method for accommodating state regulation with the anti-
trust laws. While it has not been used as a method for determining
whether the antitrust laws apply,78 the underlying rationale may have
utility in antitrust analysis. It recognizes that public interest factors are
critical in this area of antitrust law. The various opinions in Otter Tail
and Cantor emphasize that not all conduct is identical for antitrust pur-
69. Id. at 595-96 (footnotes omitted).
70. The municipal utilities in the City of Lafayette case were not subject to state regulation. 435
U.S. at 404 n.27. See also Note, Antitrust-Whither Municipal Antitrust Liability After Lafayette?,
15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 100-04 (1979).
71. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-12 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 611.
73. See Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal
Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575, 593-94 (1978); Handler, Anti-
trust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1387 (1978). The test proposed by Justice Blackmun has
been the subject of much comment. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 62; Rogers, The State Action
Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 147 (1978); Note, The State Action Antitrust Exemption:
The Confinement of the Parker Doctrine Within the Emerging Cantor Formula, 29 HASTINGS L.J.
211 (1977).
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poses. Utilities present a unique problem that usually is addressed by spe-
cific statutory regulation. " This uniqueness should not be ignored if the
conduct in question is not covered by an antitrust immunity.
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL ACTIVITY
A. Some Preliminary Observations
The proper scope of the Parker state action immunity has generated
considerable scholarly debate.7 5 The line of cases culminating in City of
Lafayette has defined the limits of the doctrine's application, but the pri-
mary focus of these discussions has been the application of immunity. A
strict standard for granting immunity is justified because immunity pre-
cludes any antitrust investigation, without regard to the degree of an-
ticompetitive effect present. Thus, there is no compelling requirement that
government and private enterprise be treated differently at the immunity
stage.
It does not follow, however, that these entities should be equated for all
antitrust purposes. Rejection of antitrust immunity should not always re-
quire a traditional application of traditional antitrust concepts. Implicit
recognition that some conduct may take on a different character based on
factors relating to the identity of the actor is evidenced in several immu-
nity cases.7 6 The Court in City of Lafayette suggested as much: "It may
be that certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when en-
gaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted
by a local government. 77 Even if immunity is withheld, the distinction
between private and municipal proprietary conduct should be considered
at some point in the proceedings. Obviously, status alone should not be
controlling. Nonetheless, there are distinctions between private and gov-
ernmental activity that, if properly considered, should affect the outcome
of the analysis.
Traditional rule of reason analysis, as described in Professional Engi-
74. See text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
75. See. e.g., Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Anti-
trust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for
Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 71 (1974); Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and
Local Governmental Action, 48 TUL. L. REV. 272 (1974).
76. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1363, 1364-70 (1978).
77. 435 U.S. at 417 n.48. The use of the word "appear" is curious. The appearance of anticompeti-
tive effect is not the basis of liability; rather, it is the existence of anticompetitive effect which triggers
antitrust sanctions. If appearance is all that concerns the court, then the note is superfluous.
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neers,78 is not flexible enough to account for factors other than those that
have some effect on competition. To limit the analysis to this degree is to
assume that a municipality is the functional equivalent of private enter-
prise in all cases. There are major differences between the two entities
that justify a modified approach for the defendant municipality.79 The
first of these relates to public interest and is based on the role of the
municipality operation." Uniqueness may be the result of a different eco-
nomic motivation on the part of the city. It may also result from the mar-
ket structure, as in the case of a municipal utility. Obviously, traditional
analysis would account for economic factors to the extent competition is
affected. But where there are anticompetitive effects caused by public pol-
icy reasons, traditional analysis would ignore the justifications and con-
demn the conduct.
From a practical standpoint, the point in the analysis at which these
distinctions are considered makes little difference. The present type of an-
titrust analysis may be divided into three stages. The first stage, the deter-
mination of antitrust immunity, is not the appropriate point to raise dis-
tinctions between the entities.81 The differences might, however, be
considered at the second stage, the application of antitrust law. Alterna-
tively, they could be mitigating factors considered at the third stage, when
remedies and damages are determined. 2 Regardless of the stage at which
the distinctions are considered, ultimately the goal is minimization of
liability.
B. Distinctions Between Municipal and Private Enterprise
The first difference between a municipality and private enterprise is
the element of public interest. Municipal corporations must serve dual
roles. In what is denominated the "governmental" role, municipalities act
as agents of the state.88 Most frequently this is accomplished through a
78. See text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
79. Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U. L. REV.
368, 379, 381-82 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Liability of Municipalities].
80. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 285-86 (1978); Note, Liabil-
ity of Municipalities, supra note 79, at 381-84; Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations:
Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo.L.J.
1547, 1556-61 (1977); Note, Antitrust Law-Municipal Immunity-Application of the State Action
Doctrine to Municipalities, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 570, 580-82.
81. The fact that immunity absolves the actor in all cases is an underlying reason for the result in
City of Lafayette.
82. See Comment, Antitrust Treble Damages as Applied to Local Government Entities: Does the
Punishment Fit the Defendant?, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 411.
83. See Note, Liability of Municipalities, supra note 79, at 377-78.
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delegation of the state's police power.84 In the other, "proprietary" role,
the municipality seeks to further the creature comfort interests of its citi-
zens. It is not always possible to distinguish clearly between these two
roles.85 The range of services provided by a municipality includes fire and
police protection, education, public health facilities, refuse collection, and
utilities. To varying degrees, these functions reflect the state's interest in
the health, welfare, and safety of its inhabitants. However, the type and
quality of a particular service also reflects the local concerns of the city's
residents. To the extent the two roles overlap, immunity will attach, after
City of Lafayette, only where there is explicit state authorization and di-
rection for the municipality's conduct." It is conceivable that some ser-
vice activity would not meet the City of Lafayette test, but would never-
theless involve an element of public interest. To equate that activity with
private enterprise interests is to ignore this distinction.
Public interest is also involved in another way. Depending upon the
particular service involved, the municipality will encounter varying levels
of competition from private business. It is unlikely, for example, that a
private firm would endeavor to provide city-wide police or fire protection.
It is likely, however, that private businesses would be engaged in refuse
collection and utility services. Citizens have come to demand certain ser-
vices from government; thus, for an activity which cannot attract entrants
from the private sector, an important public interest is served by the mu-
nicipality that provides a desired or required service without regard to
direct economic reward.
Related to the public policy element of municipal conduct noted above
are some unique economic factors. First, some services provided by mu-
nicipalities are in areas conducive to the development of natural monop-
oly.87 Competition in these areas is inadequate to prevent concentration of
economic wealth and power. Thus, one goal of antitrust law, free competi-
tion, is not achieved. State regulation is used as an acceptable substitute
for competition to prevent the abuses of monopoly.88 State regulation, of
course, is generally permitted, even though anticompetitive, by application
84. See I E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 62-64 (1956 & Supp. 1978).
85. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §10.05 (3d ed. 1979).
86. 435 U.S. at 417.
87. Utilities are the chief example. See Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An
Introduction to Comparative Analysis, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 261, 267-69 (1961). For a
discussion of the utility industry in general, see Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry:
The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64 (1972); Shenefield, Antitrust Policy Within
the Electric Utility Industry, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 681 (1971); Note, Regulation, Competition, and
Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 785. For an argument against regulation of utili-
ties, see Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, II J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
88. See Kennedy, supra note 62, at 49-50 (1979).
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of the Parker immunity. A municipality may still seek the same ends,
although it is not subject to, or a participant in, state regulation. To. the
extent that a municipality acts to prevent abuse of natural monopoly
power, 89 some consideration should be afforded it.
Municipal operation of certain utility services may provide for reduced
rate levels.90 Rate-setting by the municipality may or may not generate
excess revenue (the equivalent of "profits") for the city. 1 Even if the
rates do generate "profit," the excess revenue may be applied to reduce
tax levies for other services. Where a private entity is involved, profit
must be returned to owners and consumer benefit is usually limited to
those consumers who are also owners. For municipalities, the beneficiaries
of excess revenues are all of the resident taxpayers. Of course, this dis-
tinction breaks down where city services are provided outside the political
limits of the city.
The municipal corporation is also subject to control by its electorate. As
the plurality in City of Lafayette noted, this control is not necessarily
sufficient to displace the antitrust law." But, why should the citizens not
be allowed to submit to anticompetitive practices in order to achieve some
associated public benefit? Consumers of goods and services in the private
sector do not have the option to control the anticompetitive behavior of
private suppliers.
The distinctions discussed above are not sufficient to justify complete
antitrust immunity. Involved in any analysis of these factors are a number
of questions of degree that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
There are, however, distinctions that are significant enough to compel
some separate treatment under the antitrust laws' The framework of anal-
ysis to be employed is described in the following section.
C. A Framework for Antitrust Analysis
The decision in City of Lafayette was confined to the first stage of anti-
trust analysis, but the process in which no immunity is found may affect
the analysis used in the second stage. Any modification of traditional
analysis will depend on the degree to which distinctiohs are considered at
the first stage. In any event, the traditional antitrust analysis can easily be
89. The possibility of abuse is recognized in City of Lafayette. 435 U.S. at 403-04.
90. Note, Regulation, Competition, and Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 785,
793 n.55.
91. 12 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 35.37c. (1970 & Supp. 1979).
92. 435 U.S. at 406.
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adjusted to the unique circumstances of cities.
1. Analysis Based on the Plurality's Test in City of Lafayette
The Lafayette plurality applied a test for immunity based on the source
of the challenged conduct. If the municipality is acting pursuant to the
authorization or direction of the state, immunity will attach.9" This ap-
proach reflects a narrow view of the Parker doctrine.94 Immunity will be
extended beyond the state level only in those cases where it is determined
that the state contemplated the anticompetitive conduct. Subordinate
state agencies, municipalities, and private parties will not be afforded spe-
cial treatment unless a significant state policy is furthered by their
conduct."'
Where the state legislative enactment is silent as to state policy, or the
state policy is neutral, there is no need at the immunity stage to delve into
possible justifications for the anticompetitive practices. Therefore, unless
justifications are to be considered at the third stage (the determination of
remedies and damages) or ignored entirely, then they must be considered
at the second stage.
The first step in traditional analysis is a preliminary examination of the
challenged conduct to determine whether the per se rule applies. At this
point, the unique business setting of a particular municipal activity may
be asserted to avoid a per se classification. It is also appropriate to con-
sider the public policy factors unique to cities at this point. Frequently,
the two considerations are interrelated. There may be reasons for avoiding
a per se application that are not found in the usual setting of solely pri-
vate competition. Granted, if the effect of the municipality's conduct is
unreasonably destructive of competition, strong policy reasons might be
needed to justify the conduct. But, as Justice Blackmun suggested in his
opinion in Cantor, courts are equipped to balance these considerations."
The per se rule recognizes the particularly serious consequences of cer-
tain behavior. The application of per se rules assumes that there rarely, if
ever, would be any sufficient justification for the conduct, and therefore
any inquiry into purpose or consumer benefit is superfluous. The assump-
tion loses some force in the municipal context, where public policy factors
have greater weight,'97 and the need for a much greater degree of prelimi-
nary scrutiny of municipal conduct is apparent. However, once that point
93. Id. at 417.
94. See Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1978).
95. 435 U.S. at 413.
96. 428 U.S. at 612 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
97.7 See Kennedy, supra note 62, at 67.
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is passed, there is no need for a modified per se approach. The conclusive
presumption of illegality should apply equally to municipalities and pri-
vate actors.
The allegation of tying made in the City of Lafayette case provides a
good example." If the allegation is true, the conduct in question consti-
tutes a traditional per se offense. If it could be shown that the case is
novel or unique, or that there are substantial policy factors underlying the
conduct, then a per se rule is inappropriate. If, on the other hand, there is
no public policy justification for the tying arrangement, a per se rule
should be applied. Where distinctions relating to the status of the enter-
prise are not significant, it is obvious that antitrust treatment should be
the same.
Where there are sufficient reasons for not applying a per se rule, it may
also be appropriate to adopt a modified rule of reason approach. Under
the traditional rule of reason approach, all competitive effects are consid-
ered but, as noted above, the municipal defendant could offer justifica-
tions for anticompetitive conduct based on factors other than its competi-
tive effect. These justifications are available to a municipality to a greater
degree than to private actors. 99 Again, the balancing approach suggested
by Justice Blackmun is an appropriate way to expand traditional rule of
reason analysis. 100
2. The Proprietary-Governmental Test
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in City of Lafayette sug-
gested a test for immunity based on a distinction between proprietary and
governmental activity.101 If this test is used, there would be careful in-
quiry at the first stage into both the policy and economic motivation for
the municipality's conduct. Obviously, where public policy factors are
paramount, the activity would be classified as governmental and would be
immune from antitrust liability. Proprietary activity would be immune
only if required by the state, and then only to the extent necessary to
make the regulatory scheme work.102 Thus, proprietary activity not re-
98. 435 U.S. at 403-04.
99. "Private parties charged with conspiring to restrain trade are not allowed to claim that they
are acting in the public interest because they are not subject to public control and because self-
interest may affect their judgment. When a restraint is imposed by city officials acting as representa-
tives of the public, however, it has the sanction of a disinterested and representative body .... .
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 277, 285-86 (1978).
100. Cf. id. at 286 (suggesting a test for municipal regulation based on a rational relation
standard).
101. 435 U.S. at 418-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
102. Id. at 425-26.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
HeinOnline -- 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 270 1980
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
quired by the state would then be scrutinized under the antitrust law.
Under this test, because justifications for the activity would be consid-
ered at the first stage of analysis, there is less reason to suggest a modified
antitrust approach. However, detailed inquiry has resulted in intense anal-
ysis of the competitive setting making the need for strict application of
per se rules less compelling. 103 This test has met criticism because of the
difficulty in drawing clear distinctions between proprietary and govern-
mental activity.10 4 Nonetheless, if this approach can be the basis for a
modified rule of reason test, a fairer and more thorough result will be
obtained. Public policy factors that support finding governmental activity
under Chief Justice Burger's test can adequately be considered under a
rule of reason approach and then weighed against the anticompetitive ef-
fect. No clear cut distinction is necessary. Only a careful judicial balanc-
ing of the competing factors need be accomplished.
D. An Example
To demonstrate a flexible approach to antitrust analysis of municipal
conduct in light of City of Lafayette, and to illustrate the potential diffi-
culties of using only traditional antitrust concepts in the absence of abso-
lute Parker immunity, let's create a hypothetical problem. Suppose that,
in a given city, three competing private firms provide refuse collection
service to subscription customers for a fee of $10 per month. The compe-
tition in this market has reached a short-term equilibrium position, and
by reason of cost factors, service fees are at a level where further reduc-
tions are impossible.1 0 There is no competition based on non-price factors
because services offered by the firms are identical. Assume further that
the city officials perceive a need for a city-run service in order to provide
better sanitation for the city for important and legitimate public health
reasons. The city can reduce health hazards through the use of more mod-
ern, more sanitary collection equipment. Also, the new equipment will be
more cost-efficient, and more frequent collections can be made. The
purchase of new equipment is made possible by financing that is less
costly than financing available to private operators. The city can provide
103. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). The court in Mackey
explained that once a court has undertaken lengthy and burdensome inquiries into the operation of a
particular industry, there is no basis for application of the per se doctrine. Id. at 619-20.
104. 435 U.S. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Note, Liability of Municipalities, supra
note 79, at 384-85; Note, Antitrust Law-Municipal Immunity-Application of the State Action
Doctrine to Municipalities, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 570.
105. If this service is of a type which lends itself to the creation of a natural monopoly, then in the
long run, one of the three competing firms could gain a superior position and eliminate the other two.
This possibility does not affect the outcome of this example.
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this service at a cost to customers of $7 per month, including the debt
service on the financed equipment. This is possible because of economies
of scale (reduced overhead, existing public works department, facilities
for bookkeeping and billing) and the use of modern equipment. Further,
the city is not generating excess revenue ("profits") at this price. Without
specific state authorization, the city enacts an ordinance establishing the
program. Participation by residents is voluntary. At this point rational
consumers will switch from the private firms to the public service °10 The
private services will probably be unable to meet this new competition, and
ultimately they will be driven from the' market. Elimination of competi-
tion is hastened or facilitated if the city subsidizes its service with reve-
nues generated from other sources.
The negative effects on competition, caused by the entry of the city into
the market for this service, are clear.10 7 The city enjoys substantial mo-
nopoly power by virtue of its status as the governing unit. Is there an
illegal use of that power here? If a private competitor achieved the same
monopoly power under similar circumstances, there would not necessarily
be an antitrust violation. But analyzing only the competitive aspects of
the city's conduct ignores other determinative factors. First, there are
valid health and public welfare reasons for the city's conduct; second,
there is no profit motive for the city to enter the market; third, city re-
sidents are presumably benefited by the city's entry, and this is the pri-
mary reason for such entry.
Traditional antitrust analysis of this problem would ignore effects not
directly related to competition. This approach would ignore important
factors of public health, welfare, and convenience, factors that are reasons
for the very existence of the city. Such factors arise in a number of pro-
prietary operations of municipalities. Municipalities may operate sports
arenas, convention centers, airport facilities, transit and utility systems, or
public health services. A city may regulate competition through zoning
commissions or through purchasing or franchising operations.' 08 The city
frequently has massive economic power based on its status as a govern-
106. It is possible that the private firms would attempt to meet the lower service fee. The city, by
virtue of the advantage of generating revenue from other sources, can eliminate competition by
merely operating this service at a loss for a period.
107. The example may be varied. Assume that the city was generating excess revenue. Chief Jus-
tice Burger might find this clearer evidence of proprietary activity. Furthermore, if the city had an
established collection service and passed an ordinance closely regulating private firms, thereby making
it more difficult to enter the market, would the conduct be permitted? Alternatively, what if the city
granted an exclusive license to one private firm?
108. Bangasser, Exposure of Municipal Corporations to Liability for Violations of the Antitrust
Laws: Antitrust Immunity after the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 URa. LAW. vii (1979).
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mental entity.1°9 If only the effect of this power is considered, there is a
much greater chance of an unfavorable result in antitrust litigation. The
source of the power is examined under the immunity analysis of City of
Lafayette. Under modified antitrust analysis, it is essential that the non-
competitive justifications for the competitive use of the power be consid-
ered. Because municipalities differ substantially from private enterprises,
the weight of these justifications must be given greater significance.
V. RELATED CONSIDERATIONS
A. Sham Litigation
One allegation in the counterclaim against the City of Lafayette con-
cerned'the use of "sham" litigation that purportedly had an anticompeti-
tive effect on the power company.110 The fundamental issue addressed by
the Court was immunity and an exception thereto. Under the Noerr-Pen-
nington"I doctrine, private parties may act in concert to influence govern-
mental action. The doctrine does not, however, necessarily apply to all
such conduct, and where the action is not taken in good faith, it is a
violation of the Sherman Act.""
Even without the Parker immunity, a municipality could conceivably
rely on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a primary defense. Again, the
question of status or identity of the perpetrator of the restraint is not
relevant to the determination of immunity. The test for legality is whether
the principal purpose of the concerted activity is to influence public offi-
cials or, instead, to block a competitor's access to the decision-making
process.'" Where there is a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims," an
abuse of the governmental process will probably be found." ' Arguably, a
municipality should be able to show much greater justification for conduct
of this nature. For example, if a large number of city residents were af-
fected by a particular problem, then judicial economy, strategy, and logis-
tics suggest that the municipality act in their stead. However, there is no
need for a modified rule of reason approach to this municipal conduct.
109. See Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1976).
110. 435 U.S. at 405.
111. The doctrine takes its name from the two cases in which it was established, Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
112. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-37
(1961).
113. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-13 (1972).
114. Id. at 512.
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The traditional approach will appropriately consider all factors in deter-
mining whether a baseless claim against the municipality exists.
B. Retroactivity
Federal decisions are commonly accorded retroactive as well as pro-
spective effect,115 but some cases are limited to purely prospective, or a
modified prospective, effect."' A number of factors must be considered in
making this determination. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 1 7 the Supreme
Court discussed these factors:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue of first impres-
sion whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed . . . Second, it
has been stressed that "we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits
in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or
retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed
by retroactive application .... 118
City of Lafayette was apparently a case of first impression establishing
a new principle of law. Also, the case overruled no precedent. Thus, to
justify only prospective application of the result, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the resolution was clearly foreshadowed. In defining this
principle in another case, ' the Court noted that "whatever development
in antitrust law was brought about was based to a great extent on existing
authorities and was an extension of doctrines which had been growing and
developing over the years. These cases did not constitute a sharp break in
the line of earlier authority or an avulsive change which caused the cur-
rent of the law thereafter to flow between new banks."' 2" Implied exemp-
tions to the antitrust laws are not favored, 21 and the few cases involving
the Parker doctrine closely limited its application. Nonetheless, preceding
cases in various circuits applied the Parker doctrine with different levels
of severity."22 Thus, it is not absolutely certain whether the City of Lafay-
ette result would fit into the first part of the test. As to the second factor,
115. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.402 [3.-2-1] (2d ed. 1974).
116. Id. at 1 0.402 [3.-2-2].
117. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
118. Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted).
119. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
120. Id. at 498-99.
121. 435 U.S. at 399.
122. Compare Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971), with Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
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whether retroactive application of the rule in City of Lafayette will fur-
ther or retard its operation, it must be remembered that the antitrust laws
are both deterrent and punitive. Retroactive application would not further
the deterrent purpose. The punitive objective, particularly harsh because
of the statutory treble damages provision, presents difficulty when the
third factor is considered.
The possibility of unjust injury or hardship is significant after the City
of Lafayette result. Generally, a finding of hardship is based on justifiable
reliance on the prior rule. However, if a decision clarifies the law in an
uncertain area, the lack of controlling precedent provides no basis for rea-
sonable reliance. "[A] party here can do no more than act upon the best
available guesses of how a court . . . will approach the conflict . . . . 12
Although there is substantial hardship if a municipality is held liable for
treble damages,1"' substantial injury brought about by justifiable reliance
on prior law, is lacking since the uncertainty of the law precludes justifia-
ble reliance.125 Nor can it be argued that the result in this case was not
foreshadowed. The Court in Parker pointed out that "we have no question
of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agree-
ment or combination by others for restraint of trade."12 6 The doctrine, as
it evolved through Cantor,127 Goldfarb,128 and Bates,129 was narrowed in
actual application. It cannot be said that "prior to those cases potential
antitrust defendants would have been justified in thinking that then cur-
rent antitrust doctrines permitted them to do all acts conducive to the
creation or maintenance of a monopoly. ... 10 Thus, the case does not
present compelling reasons for prospective application of the new rule. If
the rule is applied retroactively, there is further justification for a modi-
fied antitrust analysis, either at the second or third stage. As the dissent
in City of Lafayette noted, the implications for municipalities are serious
indeed. Because immunity may not be found, a modified approach would
ameliorate the potential harsh effects of retroactivity.
123. Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907, 946 (1962).
124. 435 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
125. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAVTICE 1 0.402 [3.-2-4] (2d ed. 1974).
126. 317 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted). Of course, this dictum can be read both ways. The very
ambiguity suggests caution for a potential actor.
127. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
128. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
129. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
130. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 499 (1968).
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VI. CONCLUSION
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light is fair warning to munic-
ipalities everywhere that the day of unfettered use of competitive re-
straints is past. The state action doctrine does not automatically exempt
municipal conduct affecting private enterprise competing with municipal
services. Municipalities have lost their implied exclusion from antitrust
law, if ever they had such an exclusion. Thus, even a lawful monopolist
may be subject to antitrust regulation when it seeks to exploit its monop-
oly in a manner not contemplated by its statutory authorization.
Having disposed of the protective mantle of state action immunity, the
analysis turns to the practical application of antitrust rules and tests de-
veloped for private enterprise and private competitive restraints. The
harsh, dogmatic per se rule does not lend itself to flexible adjustment in
contemplation of the status of the municipality as an entity for the fur-
therance of the public health, safety, and welfare. The finality with which
the rule summarily prohibits particular competitive restraints is inappro-
priate where many justifying factors favor an approach that takes into
consideration the principal reasons for the existence of the municipality.
The traditional rule of reason, with its expansive approach and its ac-
ceptance of business reasons for the restraint, as well as its consideration
of the availability of viable alternatives, is more appropriate than is the
per se rule in analyzing the conduct of a municipality. But the rule of
reason does not satisfy the need for a unique application of an antitrust
rule that will recognize the authorized monopoly power inherent in mu-
nicipal services and yet not unduly penalize the municipality for wielding
such power. What is needed is an analytical approach that will restrict
unfair extension of the statutory monopoly power of the municipality and
at the same time permit all use of that power necessary to gain the full
benefits of necessary services to which citizens of the municipality are
entitled. The dilemma is obvious; the solution is not.
This paper has suggested a modified antitrust approach to the question
of liability once the state action immunity has been rejected. Preferably,
the approach should be incorporated into an early stage of the analysis,
immediately after the rule of immunity has been found inapplicable.
Before categorically labeling the municipal activity as per se illegal, the
purpose for the existence of the municipality should be considered, as well
as the public welfare objectives of the municipal service and the restraints
effected by the challenged conduct. It may be that few municipally im-
posed anticompetitive restraints will be found to be per se illegal under
this approach, but that is preferable to an analysis that is blind to the
special situation of the municipality.
Urban citizens have come to rely upon government for many services
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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that were once privately provided. The list will expand as citizens demand
more and more for their tax dollars. On the other hand, it has never been
thought that municipal power should be used to unreasonably restrain pri-
vate business enterprise in its appropriate arena. Where private enterprise
and municipal power compete, compromise is necessary to satisfy the con-
flicting policies. It is hoped that the moderate approach this article sug-
gests will effectuate such compromise where municipal proprietary ser-
vices and private enterprise interact competitively.
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